In an electric power system, demand fluctuations may result in significant ancillary cost to suppliers. Furthermore, in the near future, deep penetration of volatile renewable electricity generation is expected to exacerbate the variability of demand on conventional thermal generating units. We address this issue by explicitly modeling the ancillary cost associated with demand variability. We note that a time-varying price equal to the suppliers' instantaneous marginal cost may not achieve social optimality, and that consumer demand fluctuations should be properly priced. We propose a dynamic pricing mechanism that explicitly encourages consumers to adapt their consumption so as to offset the variability of demand on conventional units. Through a dynamic gametheoretic formulation, we show that (under suitable convexity assumptions) the proposed pricing mechanism achieves social optimality asymptotically, as the number of consumers increases to infinity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our motivation stems from the fact that fluctuations in the demand to be met by conventional thermal generating units typically result in significantly increased, and nontrivial, ancillary costs. Today, such demand fluctuations are mainly due to time-dependent consumer preferences. In addition, in the future, a certain percentage of electricity production is required by law in many states in the U.S. to come from renewable resources [4] . The dramatic volatility of renewable energy resources may aggravate the variability of the demand for conventional thermal generators and result in significant ancillary cost.
In this paper, we explore the issue of whether prices should explicitly encourage consumers to adapt their demands so as to reduce supplier ancillary cost. To illustrate the issue that we focus on, we note that a basic model of electricity markets assumes that the cost of satisfying a given level A t of aggregate demand during period t is of the form C(A t ). It then follows that in a well-functioning wholesale market, the observed price should more or less reflect the marginal cost C ′ (A t ). As a consequence, prices should be more or less determined by the aggregate demand level. Empirical data do not quite support this view. Figure 1 plots the real-time system load and the hourly prices on February 11, 2011 and on February 16, 2011, as reported by the New England ISO. We observe that prices do not seem to be determined solely by A t ; instead changes in demand, A t − A t−1 , seem to play a major role. In particular, the largest prices seem to occur after a demand surge, and not necessarily at the hour when the load is the highest. Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA; email: jnt@mit.edu, yunjian@mit.edu. This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grant CMMI-0856063 and by a Graduate Fellowship from Shell. Since the supplier cost does not depend only on the current system load, a simple argument based on standard mathematical programming optimality conditions shows that the "marginal cost pricing" mechanism, which charges consumers a time-varying price that equals the suppliers' instantaneous marginal cost, may not achieve social optimality, consistent with [18] .
A. Summary of contributions
Our main contributions are as follows: (a) We provide a stylized (yet quite rich) model of an electricity market, which incorporates the cost of ancillary services (cf. Section II). (b) We propose a pricing mechanism that properly charges for the effects of consumer actions on ancillary services (cf. Section III). (c) For a continuum model featuring a nonatomic continuum of consumers, we introduce the notion of a Dynamic Oblivious Equilibrium (DOE), in which every consumer maximizes her expected payoff, under the sequence of prices induced by the DOE strategy profile. We show that (under standard convexity assumptions), our mechanism maximizes social welfare in a model involving a continuum of (price-taking) consumers (cf. Theorem 6.1). (d) We consider the case of a large but finite number of consumers and study it from a game-theoretic perspective. We show that a large population of consumers who act according to a DOE results in asymptotically optimal (as the number of consumers goes to infinity) social welfare (cf. Theorem 6.1), and asymptotically maximizes every consumer's expected payoff (cf. Theorem 5.1).
B. Related literature
There are two streams of literature that are related to our work: the electricity pricing and the game-theoretic literature.
Regarding electricity markets, the impact of supply friction on economic efficiency and price volatility has received some recent attention. In a continuous-time competitive market model, Cho and Meyn [8] show that the limited capability of generating units to meet real-time demand, due to relatively low ramping rates, does not harm social welfare, but may result in extreme price fluctuations. In a similar spirit, Kizilkale and Mannor construct a dynamic game-theoretic model to study the tradeoff between economic efficiency and price volatility [10] . Closer to the present paper, Cho and Meyn construct a dynamic newsboy model to study the reserve management problem in electricity markets [9] , where the demand is assumed to be exogenous. The supplier cost in their model depends not only on the overall demand, but also on the generation resources used to satisfy the demand. For example, a quickly increasing demand may require more responsive and more expensive resources (e.g., peaking generation plants). Furthermore, Wang et al. [18] study a somewhat related dynamic competitive equilibrium that includes ancillary services with ramping constraints.
To study the impact of pricing mechanisms on consumer behavior and load fluctuations, we construct a dynamic game-theoretic model that differs from existing dynamic electricity market models, and incorporates both the consumers' responses to real-time price fluctuations and the suppliers' ancillary cost incurred by load swings. Some major differences between our model and existing ones are discussed at the end of Section II.
On the game-theoretic side, there is a large literature on a variety of approximation properties of nonatomic equilibrium concepts [12] , [1] , [19] , [2] . Recently, the authors of [3] derive sufficient conditions for a stationary equilibrium strategy to have the Asymptotic Markov Equilibrium (AME) property, which requires that a stationary equilibrium strategy asymptotically maximizes every agent's expected payoff, as the number of agents grows large. Their model includes random shocks that are assumed to be idiosyncratic across agents. However, in the problem that we are interested in, it is important to incorporate aggregate shocks (such as weather conditions) that have a global impact on all agents in an electricity market. In this spirit, the authors of [20] consider a market model with aggregate profit shocks, and study an equilibrium concept at which every firm's strategy depends on the firm's current state and on the recent history of the aggregate shock.
For a general dynamic game model with aggregate shocks, Bodoh-Creed shows that a nonatomic equivalent of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), which we refer to as a Dynamic Oblivious Equilibrium (DOE) in this paper, asymptotically approximates an MPE in the sense that as the number of agents increases to infinity, the actions taken in an MPE can be well approximated by those taken by a DOE strategy of the nonatomic limit game [6] . However, without further restrictive assumptions on the agents' state transition kernel, the approximation property of the actions taken by a DOE strategy does not imply the AME property of the DOE, and we are not aware of any AME results for models that include aggregate shocks. Our work is different in this respect: for a dynamic nonatomic model with aggregate shocks, which is a simplified variation of the general model considered in [6] , we prove the AME property of a DOE.
The efficiency of nonatomic equilibria for static games has been addressed in recent research [16] , [13] , [7] . For a dynamic industry model with a continuum of identical producers and exogenous aggregate shocks, the authors of [11] show (under convexity assumptions) that the expected social welfare is maximized at a unique competitive equilibrium. In a similar spirit, in this paper we show (under convexity assumptions) that the proposed pricing mechanism maximizes the expected social welfare in a model involving a continuum of (possibly heterogeneous) consumers. We also consider the case of a large but finite number of consumers, and show that the expected social welfare is approximately maximized if all consumers act according to a nonatomic equilibrium (DOE). For large dynamic games, the asymptotic social optimality of nonatomic equilibria (DOEs) established in this paper seems to be new.
C. Outline of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the dynamic game model. In Section III, we propose a dynamic pricing mechanism. In Section IV, we give the formal definition of a DOE. In Section V, we show that as the number of consumers increases to infinity, every consumer's expected payoff is approximately maximized by a DOE strategy, if the other consumers follow the DOE strategy. In Section VI, we validate the asymptotic social optimality of the proposed pricing mechanism. In Section VII, we make some brief concluding remarks.
II. MODEL
We consider a (T + 1)-stage dynamic game with the following elements:
1) The game is played in discrete time. We index the time periods with t = 0, 1, . . . , T . Each stage may represent a five minute interval in real-time balancing markets where prices and dispatch solutions are typically provided at five minute intervals. 2) There are n consumers, indexed by 1, . . . , n.
3) At each stage t, let s t ∈ S be an exogenous state, which evolves as a Markov chain and whose transitions are independent of the consumer actions. The set S is assumed to be finite. In electricity markets, the exogenous state may represent time and/or the weather conditions, which impact consumer utility and supplier cost. 4) For notational conciseness, for t ≥ 1, let s t = (s t−1 , s t ), and let s 0 = s 0 . We refer to s t as the global state at stage t. 5) Given an initial global state s 0 , the initial states (types) of the consumers, {x i,0 } n i=1 , are independently drawn according to a probability measure η s0 over a finite set X 0 . We use X to denote the cardinality of X 0 . 6) At stage t, the state of consumer i is denoted by x i,t .
At t = 0, consumer i's initial state, x i,0 , indicates her type. For t = 1, . . . , T , we have
where z i,t ∈ Z and Z = [0, Z] is a compact subset of R. The variables {z i,t } n i=1 allow us to model intertemporal substitution effects in consumer i's demand. 7) We use X t to denote a consumer's state space at stage t. In particular, at stage t ≥ 1, X t = X 0 × Z. 8) At stage t, consumer i takes an action a i,t , and receives a nonnegative utility
is a positive real number. (In the electric power context, B could reflect a transmission capacity constraint.) 10) We use A t = n i=1 a i,t to denote the aggregate demand at stage t. 11) Given consumer i's current state, x i,t , and the next exogenous state s t+1 , the next state of consumer i is determined by her action taken at stage t, i.e.,
where R t is the system reserve at stage t. For simplicity, we assume that the system reserve at stage t depends only on the current aggregate demand, A t , and the current exogenous state s t . That is, we have R t = g(A t , s t ) for a given function of g that reflects the reserve policy of the system operator. 13) At stage t, let C(A t , R t , s t ) denote the sum of the supplier's generation cost to meet the aggregate demand A t through its primary energy resources, e.g., baseload power plants, and the cost to maintain a system reserve R t . Since R t depends only on A t and s t , we can write C(A t , R t , s t ) as a function of A t and s t , i.e., there exists a primary cost function C :
We assume that for any s ∈ S, C(·, s) is nondecreasing.
note the ancillary cost incurred by load swings 2 .
Since R t depends only on A t and s t , we can write
s t−1 , and s t , i.e., there exists an ancillary cost function H :
The ancillary cost at stage 0 is assumed to be a function of s 0 and A 0 . 15) At stage 0, the total supplier cost is of the form
and for t = 1, . . . , T , the total supplier cost at stage t is given by
In contrast to existing dynamic models for electricity markets with an exogenous demand process [8] , [9] , our dynamic game-theoretic model incorporates the consumer reactions to price fluctuations, and allows us to study the impact of pricing mechanisms on consumer behavior and economic efficiency. Through a dynamic game-theoretic formulation, Kizilkale and Mannor study the tradeoff between economic efficiency and price volatility [10] . Our model is different from the one studied in [10] in the following aspects: 1) Our model allows the generation cost to depend on the exogenous state(s), and therefore incorporates supplyside volatility due to uncertainty in renewable electricity generation. As an example, consider a case where the exogenous state, s t , represents the electricity generation from renewable resources at stage t. Then the demand for conventional generation is A t − s t . Suppose that the system reserve is proportional to the system load, say, δA t for some constant δ > 0. The cost function, C(A t , R t , s t ), then depends only on the output of conventional generating units, A t − s t , and the system reserve, δA t . The ancillary cost occurred at stage t depends on the system reserve and the outputs of conventional generating units at stages t − 1 and t, and is therefore a function of A t−1 , A t , s t−1 , and s t . 2) More important, instead of penalizing each consumer's attempt to change her action across time, the ancillary cost function in our model penalizes the change in the aggregate demand of all consumers. The change in a single consumer's action may harm or benefit the social welfare, while the volatility of the aggregate demand is usually undesirable.
The main feature of our model is the ancillary cost function H, which makes the supplier cost nonseparable over time. In an electric power system, the ancillary cost function models the costs associated with the variability of conventional thermal generator output, such as the energy cost of peaking plants and the redispatch cost. Note that the ancillary cost is not necessarily zero when A t ≤ A t−1 , because thermal generating units have ramping-down constraints, and because a decrease in renewable electricity production may deploy the system reserve, even if A t ≤ A t−1 . The presence of the ancillary cost function makes marginal cost pricing inefficient.
To keep the model simple, we do not incorporate any idiosyncratic randomness in consumer state evolution. Thus, besides the randomness of consumer types (initial states), the only source of stochasticity in the model is from the exogenous state s t .
To effectively highlight the impact of pricing mechanisms on consumer behavior, as well as on economic efficiency and demand volatility, we have made the following simplifications and assumptions for the power grid.
(a) As in [8] , we assume that the physical production capacity is large enough so that the possible changes of the generation capacity are not constrained. (b) Transmission capacity is large enough to avoid any congestion. We also assume that the cost of supplying electricity to consumers in different locations is the same. Therefore, a common price for all consumers is appropriate. We now give some notations that will be useful later. For t = 1, . . . , T , let y i,t = (a i,t−1 , x i,t ) be the augmented state of consumer i at stage t. At t = 0, let y i,0 = x i,0 . At stage t, let Y t be the set of all possible augmented states. In particular, we have Y 0 = X 0 , and Y t = A × X t , for t = 1, . . . , T .
For the rest of the paper, we let ∆ n (·) denote the set of empirical probability distributions over a given set that can be generated by n samples from the given set. We use f t ∈ ∆ n (Y t ) to denote the empirical distribution of the augmented state of all consumers at stage t, and use f −i,t ∈ ∆ n−1 (Y t ) to denote the empirical distribution of the augmented state of all consumers (excluding consumer i) at stage t. Throughout the rest of the paper, we refer to f t as the population state at stage t. Let u −i,t ∈ ∆ n−1 (A) be the empirical distribution of all consumers' (excluding consumer i) actions at stage t.
III. THE PRICING MECHANISM
Suppose that for any s ∈ S, C(·, s) is differentiable on (−∞, ∞), and that for any
and for t = 1, . . . , T ,
At stage 0, we let q 0 = 0 and w 0 = H ′ 0 (A 0 , s 0 ). Under the proposed pricing mechanism, consumer i's payoff at stage t is given by
Note that p t + w t is the supplier marginal cost at stage t (including the marginal ancillary cost). The proposed pricing mechanism charges consumer i an additional price q t , equal to the marginal ancillary cost with respect to a i,t−1 , on her previous demand.
To understand the nature of the mechanism, consider a scenario where demand increases quickly. Generally,
On the other hand, when demand decreases quickly, it is possible to have q t be nonnegative and w t be nonpositive. Since C(·, s) is naturally nondecreasing, p t is always nonnegative.
IV. DYNAMIC OBLIVIOUS EQUILIBRIUM
To study the aggregate behavior of a large number of consumers in an electricity market, we consider a nonatomic game consisting of a continuum of infinitesimally small consumers indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. In a nonatomic model, any single consumer's action has no influence on the aggregate demand and the prices. We consider a class of dynamic oblivious strategies in which a consumer's action depends only on the history of past exogenous states, h t = (s 0 , . . . , s t ), and her current state, i.e., of the form
Suppose that consumer i uses a dynamic oblivious strategy ν = (ν 0 , . . . , ν T ). Since there is no idiosyncratic randomness, given a history h t , the state x i,t of consumer i at stage t depends only on her initial state x i,0 . That is, there is a mapping l ν,ht : X 0 → X t , such that x i,t = l ν,ht (x i,0 ). Therefore, we can write the action taken by a dynamic oblivious strategy as
Let ν = {ν 0 , . . . , ν T } denote a dynamic oblivious strategy, and V be the set of all such strategies. An alternative form of strategies that depends on consumers' expectations on future prices would lead to a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE), an equilibrium concept based on the rational expectations approach pioneered by Muth [14] . In our continuum model, since the only source of stochasticity is from the exogenous state s t , given a strategy profile, future prices are completely determined by the history h t . Therefore, it is not implausible to expect that the strategy defined in (6) will lead to an equilibrium concept (DOE) that is identical in outcomes with a REE (cf. the discussion in Section IV-B).
Before formally defining a Dynamic Oblivious Equilibrium (DOE), we would like to give some intuition on the idea behind this equilibrium concept. In a continuum model, if all consumers use a common dynamic oblivious strategy ν, the aggregate demand and the prices at stage t depend only on the sequence of exogenous states, h t = (s 0 , . . . , s t ).
A dynamic oblivious strategy ν is a DOE (cf. the formal definition in Section IV-B) if it maximizes every consumer's value function, under the sequence of prices that ν induces.
A. The sequence of prices induced by a dynamic oblivious strategy
Let h t = (s 0 , . . . , s t ) denote a history, up to stage t, and let H t = S t+1 denote the set of all possible histories of length t+1. Note that in a continuum model, given an initial global state s 0 , the distribution of consumers' initial states is η s0 . Therefore, under a history h t , if all consumers use the same dynamic oblivious strategy ν, then the average demand is
We now introduce the cost functions in a continuum model. Let C : R × S → [0, ∞) be a primary cost function in a continuum model. Let H : R 2 × S 2 → [0, ∞) be an ancillary cost function at stage t ≥ 1, and let H 0 : R × S → [0, ∞) be an ancillary cost function at the initial stage 0.
Given the cost functions in a continuum model, we let q 0|ν,h0 = 0, and define the sequence of prices induced by a dynamic oblivious strategy as follows:
We want the cost functions in a continuum model to approximate the cost functions in an n-consumer model. Since the continuum of consumers is described by distributions over [0, 1], the demand given in (7) can be regarded as the average demand per consumer. We assume the following relation between the cost functions in a continuum model and their counterparts in the corresponding n-consumer model. where the superscript n is used to indicate that these are the cost functions associated with an n-consumer model.
B. Equilibrium strategies
In this subsection we will define the concept of a DOE. Suppose that all consumers other than i use a dynamic oblivious strategy ν. In a continuum model, consumer i's action does not affect the prices. If all consumers except i use a dynamic oblivious strategy ν, consumer i's oblivious stage value (stage payoff in a continuum model) under a history h t and an action a i,t , is
where the prices, p t|ν,ht , w t|ν,ht , and q t|ν,ht , are defined in (8) and (9) . Since a single consumer's action cannot influence q t , the last term in (10) is not affected by the action a i,t , and the decision at stage t need not take a i,t−1 into account, but takes q t+1 into account.
Consumer i's oblivious stage value under a dynamic oblivious strategyν, is 3
In particular, we use π i,t (y i,t , h t | ν, ν) to denote the oblivious stage value of consumer i at stage t, if all consumers use the strategy ν. Given a history h t , and the current augmented state of consumer i, y i,t , her oblivious value function (future expected payoff function in a continuum model) is
where the expectation is over the future global states,
Definition 4.1: A strategy ν is a Dynamic Oblivious Equilibrium (DOE) if for any x i,0 ∈ X 0 and any ∀s 0 ∈ S,
A DOE is guaranteed to exist, under suitable assumptions, and this is known to be the case even for a more general model with idiosyncratic randomness [5] . The DOE defined above, is essentially the same concept as the "dynamic competitive equilibrium" studied in [6] , which is defined as the nonatomic equivalent of an MPE in a continuum model. At a DOE, the beliefs of all the consumers on future prices are consistent with the equilibrium outcomes. Therefore, the nonatomic DOE is identical in outcomes with a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE). In future electricity markets, consumers may form rational expectations of future prices through an adaptive learning process, or they may receive price estimates from utilities and/or the independent system operator through advanced metering infrastructures.
V. APPROXIMATION IN LARGE GAMES
In this section, we consider a sequence of dynamic games, and show that as the number of consumers increases to infinity, a DOE strategy for the corresponding continuum game is asymptotically optimal for every consumer (i.e., an approximate best response), if the other consumers follow that same strategy. In some sense, this result provides a justification of the dynamic competitive equilibrium considered in [18] and other works. Of course, the result only applies to the case of a large number of relatively small players, not in cases where the consumers are large size aggregators with possibly significant market power.
In the rest of the paper, we sometimes use a superscript n to indicate quantities associated with an n-consumer model. In an n-consumer model, suppose that all consumers except i use a dynamic oblivious strategy ν, and that consumer i uses a history-dependent strategy κ n = {κ n t } T t=0 of the form a i,t = κ n t (y i,t , h t , f n −i,t ).
Given an initial global state, s 0 , and consumer i's initial state, x i,0 , let V n i,0 (x i,0 , s 0 | κ n , ν) denote consumer i's expected payoff under the strategy κ n .
Definition 5.1: A dynamic oblivious strategy ν has the asymptotic Markov equilibrium (AME) property [3] , if for any initial global state s 0 ∈ S, any initial state x i,0 ∈ X 0 , and any sequence of history-dependent strategies {κ n }, we have lim sup n→∞ V n i,0 (x i,0 , s 0 | κ n , ν) − V n i,0 (x i,0 , s 0 | ν, ν) ≤ 0. Under the following assumption, we will show that every DOE has the AME property.
Assumption 5.1: We assume that: where Q is a positive constant. We argue in the following theorem that a DOE strategy approximately maximizes a consumer's expected payoff (among all possible history-dependent strategies) in a dynamic game with a large but finite number of consumers, if the other consumers also use that strategy.
Theorem 5.1: Suppose that Assumptions 4.1 and 5.1 hold. Every DOE has the AME property.
Theorem 5.1 is proved in Appendix C of [17] .
VI. ASYMPTOTIC SOCIAL OPTIMALITY In Section VI-A, we define the social welfare associated with an n-consumer model and with a continuum model. In Section VI-B, we show that for a continuum model, the social welfare is maximized at a DOE, and that for a sequence of nconsumer models, if all consumers use the DOE strategy of the corresponding continuum model, then the social welfare is asymptotically maximized, as the number of consumers increases to infinity.
A. Social welfare
In an n-consumer model, let the vector a t = (a 1,t , . . . , a n,t ) denote the vector of actions taken by all consumers at stage t, and let the vector x t = (x 1,t , . . . , x n,t ) denote the vector of consumers' states at stage t. Under the current population state and global state, the social welfare realized at stage t is
and at stage 0, the social welfare is
Let W n t (f n t , h t | κ n ) denote the social welfare realized at stage t, under a symmetric history-dependent strategy profile κ n = (κ n , . . . , κ n ) (cf. the definition of a history-dependent strategy in Eq. (13)). Given an initial global state s 0 and an initial population state f n 0 , let W n 0 (f n 0 , s 0 | κ n ) denote the expected social welfare achieved under a symmetric historydependent strategy profile κ n , during the T + 1 stages. In particular, we use W n 0 (f n 0 , s 0 | ν n ) to denote the expected social welfare achieved by a symmetric dynamic oblivious strategy profile, ν n = (ν, . . . , ν). In a continuum model, the social welfare achieved at each stage is defined in a way similar to that in Eqs. (14) and (15); we let W 0 (s 0 | ν) denote the expected social welfare achieved when every consumer uses the dynamic oblivious strategy ν, and the initial global state is s 0 .
B. Asymptotic social optimality of a DOE
We first define some notation that will be useful in this subsection. Since there is no idiosyncratic randomness, given a history h t , the state of consumer i at stage t depends only on her initial state x i,0 , and her actions taken at τ = 0, . . . , t − 1. At stage t ≥ 1, the history h t and the transition function z i,t+1 = r(x i,t , a i,t , s t+1 ) define a mapping k ht : X 0 × A t → Z:
Given an initial state x i,0 , consumer i's total utility under a history h t can be written as a function of her actions taken at stages τ = 0, . . . , t:
(17) Before stating the main result of this section, we introduce a series of assumptions on the convexity and differentiability of the cost and the utility functions. Assumption 6.1: We assume the following.
6.1.1. For any s ∈ S, C(·, s) is convex; for any s ∈ S 2 , H(A, A ′ , s) is convex in (A, A ′ ). 6.1.2. For any h T ∈ H T and any x i,0 ∈ X 0 , the function defined in (17) is concave with respect to the vector (a i,0 , . . . , a i,T ). 6.1.3. For any t ≥ 1, any h t ∈ H t , and any x i,0 ∈ X 0 , the function k ht defined in (16) is monotonic in a i,τ , for τ = 0, . . . , t − 1; further, its left and right derivatives with respect to a i,τ exist, for τ = 0, . . . , t − 1. 6.1.4. For t ≥ 1, and for any (x, s, a) ∈ X 0 × S × A, the left and right derivatives of the utility function U t (x, z, s, a) in z exist. Assumption 6.1.1 is standard. If the utility function is concave in a, Assumption 6.1.2 requires that the transition function k ht preserve concavity (a linear function would be an example). Note that Assumptions 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 guarantee that in both models (a dynamic game with a finite number of consumers, and the corresponding continuum game), the expected social welfare (consumer i's expected payoff) is concave in the actions taken by all consumers (respectively, by consumer i). Assumptions 6.1.3 and 6.1.4 ensure the existence of left and right derivatives of the expected social welfare with respect to the actions taken by consumers. An example where Assumptions 6.1.2-6.1.4 hold is given next. Example 6.1: Consider appliances such as Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEVs), dish washers, or clothes washers. For such appliances, a customer usually only cares whether a task is completed before a certain time.
Given an initial state (type) of consumer i, x i,0 , let D(x i,0 ) and T (x i,0 ) indicate her total desired demand and the stage by which the task has to be completed, respectively. Under a given history h t , the total utility accumulated by consumer i until time t is assumed to be of the form
for some function Z. If for every x i,0 ∈ X 0 , Z(x i,0 , · ) is nondecreasing and concave, then Assumption 6.1.2 holds. At stage t = 0, we have
For t ≥ T (x i,0 ) + 1, we let z i,t = D(x i,0 ), and let U t (x i,t , s t , a i,t ) be identically zero. Suppose that for every x i,0 ∈ X 0 , the right and left derivatives of Z(x i,0 , · ) exist. Then, Assumptions 6.1.3 and 6.1.4 hold. Theorem 6.1: Suppose that Assumptions 4.1, 5.1, and 6.1 hold. Let ν be a DOE of the continuum game. Then, the following hold.
(a) In the continuum game, the social welfare is maximized (over all symmetric dynamic oblivious strategy profiles) at the DOE, i.e., 5
where V is the set of all dynamic oblivious strategies. (b) For a sequence of n-consumer games, the symmetric DOE strategy profile, ν n = (ν, . . . , ν), approximately maximizes the expected social welfare, as the number of consumers increases to infinity. That is, for any initial global state s 0 , and any sequence of symmetric historydependent strategy profiles {κ n }, we have 6 lim sup
where the expectation is over the initial population state, f n 0 .
5 Note that we are only comparing the social welfare under different symmetric dynamic oblivious strategy profiles, where all consumers are using the same dynamic oblivious strategy (ν or ϑ). This is no loss of generality because under Assumption 6.1, the social welfare in a continuum game is a concave function of the collection of consumer actions taken under the different histories. Hence, it can be shown that the optimal social welfare can be achieved by a symmetric dynamic oblivious strategy profile. 6 Under Assumption 6.1, the social welfare in an n-consumer game is a concave function of the collection of consumer actions taken under the different histories. Therefore, sup κ n ∈Kn W n 0 (f n 0 , s 0 | κ n ) is also the maximum social welfare that can be achieved by a (possibly non-symmetric) history-dependent strategy profile.
The proof of Theorem 6.1 can be found in Appendix D of [17] . In a continuum model, since the social welfare is concave on consumers' actions, part (a) can be shown through a standard optimality-condition based argument. In an n-consumer model, given the initial global state s 0 and an initial population state f n 0 , the expected social welfare can be maximized if all consumers use a common dynamic oblivious strategy ϑ n,f n 0 . If the initial population state f n 0 is close to its expectation, it can be shown that the optimal social welfare in the n-consumer model, which could be achieved by the symmetric dynamic oblivious strategy profile ϑ n,f n 0 = (ϑ n,f n 0 , . . . , ϑ n,f n 0 ), is close to the social welfare achieved by the same strategy profile in the corresponding continuum model. Part (b) follows from the fact that as the number of consumer grows large, with high probability the initial population state f n 0 is close to its expectation, η s0 .
VII. CONCLUSION
In an electric power system, load swings may result in significant ancillary cost to suppliers. Inspired by the observation that marginal cost pricing may not achieve social optimality in electricity markets, we proposed a new dynamic pricing mechanism that takes into account the externality conferred by a consumer's action on future ancillary cost. Besides proposing a suitable game-theoretic model that incorporates the cost of load fluctuation and a particular pricing mechanism for electricity markets, a main contribution of this paper was to show that the proposed pricing mechanism achieves social optimality in a dynamic nonatomic game, and approximate social optimality for the case of finitely many consumers, under certain convexity assumptions. Some numerical results providing insights into the potential benefits of our mechanism are provided in [17] .
We emphasize here that there remain several challenging issues for the implementation of the proposed mechanism, e.g., the accuracy of future price estimates and the uncertainty of consumer response to ex ante price estimates. For example, it is shown in [15] that if consumers act myopically to highly inaccurate price estimates, real-time pricing may result in extreme price volatility. However, we note that these challenges are generic to almost all kinds of real-time pricing mechanisms.
